This paper looks at whether the tendency of some governments to borrow short term is reinforced by financial support from the International Monetary Fund. I first present a model of sovereign debt issuance at various maturities featuring endogenous liquidity crises and maturity mismatches due to financial under-development. I use the model to analyse the impact of IMF lending during debt crises on the sovereign's optimal maturity structure. Within the model, although IMF assistance is able to catalyse private flows, this provides incentives for government to issue larger amounts of short-term debt, making the roll-over problem larger. I take the model to the data and find support for the hypothesis that IMF lending leads countries to increase their short-term borrowing. Additionally, I do not find any positive effect of IMF lending on countries' ability to tap international capital markets. These results help explain why a catalytic effect of IMF lending has proved empirically elusive.
Introduction
Debt defaults and restructurings are an unfortunate regularity in sovereign bonds' markets. 1 More often than not countries facing debt distress had accumulated large amounts of short term and foreign currency denominated debt. Indeed, in most cases, the trigger of the crises was the inability of the sovereign to either roll over or pay back maturing debt. 2 As part of the crisis-resolution strategy, many episodes featured involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which took on the role of an International Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). The IMF provided these economies with working capital while they solved their problems. These interventions have both opponents and supporters. The absence of strong evidence regarding a positive impact of o¢ cial lending has served IMF critics to claim that overestimation of its catalytic role has led the Fund to impose excessively contractive policies (Birds and Rowlands, 2002) . Moreover, opponents argue that such policies generate moral hazard both on debtors and creditors, and that the Fund's seniority status is detrimental for the debtor-creditors relationship as it might dilute private obligations (Saravia, 2010) . On the opposite side, defenders argue that, by reassuring private creditors about the existence of an ordered exit of the crisis, these interventions could catalyze private ‡ows when most needed (Corsetti et al., 2006 ). An extensive literature has ‡ourished aimed at measuring the importance of this catalytic e¤ect. At best the evidence is mixed. A majority of studies, either regression analyses or case studies, put in doubt the existence of any such positive e¤ect (Ghosh et al, 2002 ). 3 In this paper I analyze a potential channel of in ‡uence of the IMF on countries'funding mostly unexplored but that, on light of past experiences, should be well understood: the relation between debt maturity and o¢ cial …nancial support programs. Jeanne (2009) presents a general equilibrium model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises owing to bad shocks. He shows that some well intentioned policies may have an e¤ect di¤erent than the one intended because of the endogeneity of debt structures. For example, taxing dangerous forms of debt leads to increased riskiness of debt in equilibrium. On the empirical side, Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2002) , using aggregate country data, …nd that IMF lending reduces the countries reliance of short term debt ‡ows. Saravia (2011) presents evidence on the relation between IMF lending and countries'private and public debt maturity choices. Using a sample from 1 Examples include Russia (1998), Argentina (2001), Jamaica (2009) or Greece (2012). 2 See Rodrik and Velasco (1999) or Jeanne (2004) for models on maturity mismatches. 3 A catalytic e¤ect has been found in some circumstances. Eichengreen and Mody (2001) …nd a stronger catalytic e¤ect for intermediate economic fundamentals. Various papers have tested whether di¤erent types of capital ‡ows react di¤erently to IMF lending. Edwards (2003) …nds no catalytic e¤ect on bond issuance. The opposite is true for Eichengreen et al. (2005) , who argue that the IMF's role as a "vigilante" is more likely to manifest in bond markets. Diaz -Cassou et al. (2006) argue that conditionality is the strongest channel of IMF catalysis. Mody and Saravia (2003) …nd that larger programs associate with stronger catalysis and that a continued IMF presence in a country reinforces this e¤ect. However, if excessively lengthy, such presence can be perceived as a sign of failure, discouraging capital ‡ows. Similarly, Eichengreen et al. (2005) …nd that, in high-debt countries, is the size of the assistance rather than the presence what attracts private capital. Broto et al. (2011) show that larger availability of Fund resources associates with lower capital ‡ows'volatility .
The model shares most with Corsetti et al. (2006) and Morris and Shin (2006) . Corsetti et al. (2006) shows that o¢ cial lending can strengthen government's incentives to implement costly policies. Moreover, they show that this is an increasing-with-size e¤ect. Similarly, Morris and Shin (2006) show that for catalytic …nance to work it needs to be a strategic complement of the government's decision to exert e¤ort, which only happens for intermediate values of the fundamentals. Also Peñalver (2004) includes a debt structure in a model of IMF lending. He shows that subsidized lending induces the borrowing country to exert e¤ort to avoid default. This in turn, by raising future rates of return on investment, encourages larger private capital ‡ows. 5 De Resende (2007) shows that, if conditionality forces the country to save more, the resulting lower probability of default can induce private lenders to relax their borrowing constraints. The model also shares with the literature on debt structure determination. As in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) , …nancial underdevelopment explains the existence of mismatches. As in Chang and Velasco (2000) or Broner et al. (2012) , countries borrow short term because it is regarded as cheaper. 6 In the second part of the paper, I use a large dataset on sovereign bond issuance to provide empirical evidence on the relation between maturities and IMF interventions. The empirical framework draws mainly from Eichengreen et al. (2001) and Saravia (2011) . The evidence, in line with Saravia (2010) , shows that the availability of o¢ cial …nancing in the form of an IMF treatment represents an incentive to bend towards shorter maturities. Moreover, I …nd that this e¤ect is especially strong for EFF programs. I also document a negative e¤ect of the size of the assistance on maturity. Lager program (In GDP terms) are accompanied by shorter debt maturities. Finally, wile controlling for sample selection, I …nd that IMF programs seem to have a negative e¤ect on issuance. This is, again, an increasing-with-size, e¤ect.
Section 1 introduces the benchmark maturity choice model and an extension where international …nancial assistance is available. Section 2 collects the empirical evidence and, …nally, Section 3 concludes. Tables, data sources and the more involved proofs are presented in the Appendix.
A benchmark economy
There are two di¤erent actors; the Government and a continuum of investors. The model evolves over 3 time periods. In period 0, the Government has a production opportunity for which it needs an amount I of funds. Government …nances it by issuing short (S) and long (L) term debt, so that I = S + L. The short and the long interest rates, de…ned by r s and r L respectively, are determined by a non-arbitrage condition. 7 As in Diamond and Dygbig (1983), ex-ante identical investors are uncertain about their time preference. They might become impatient and value interim-period consumption only. Investors' only know that with probability they will be of the impatient type and with probability (1 ) will derive the same utility from consumption at any time. I assume that, in the interim period, the Government must roll its short term debt over and o¤ers investors a premium to delay repayment. Investors must decide wether to accept or ‡ee. In case of need the Government can tap an uncertain amount of resources . If the roll-over fails, the government defaults and faces a reputational cost. 9 Investors'course of action in period 1 will depend on the realization of both and a private signal on they receive. Secondary market for long term debt also opens in period 1. Impatient investors can use it to adjust their portfolio. In the last period payments are realized.
The information structure is the following. At time 0, all that is known is that Government's interim-period resources are uniformly distributed,
, that the probability of being impatient is , and the roll-over premium. In period 1, investors receive private signals about ,
Before moving to the determination of the maturity structure, I describe how the roll-over and the secondary market, it's main determinants, work.
Roll-over Game
Investors facing the roll over decision are engaged in a coordination game. There are strategic complementarities, as investors'payo¤s depend on the action taken by the others. The payo¤ for an investor who decides to roll-over is
The (ex-ante known) roll-over premium is > 1: In the event of a default, investors get nothing. Conversely, if an investor withdraws her payo¤ is
where stands for the recovery rate in a default event. Unconstrained investors use their private information about the liquidity position of the Government, x i , to decide whether to roll-over or ‡ee. 10 The project will only be successful if the government has enough resources to cover the gap created by a lack of willingness from investors to roll-over maturing debt. 11 Such condition is ful…lled whenever > f; where f denotes the proportion of investors ‡eeing.
I will be interested in equilibria in trigger strategies. 12 This amounts to …nd a value which generates a distribution of signals such that there is a unique value x below which investors prefer to withdraw. First, I set a equation where the value of generates a selling pressure matching itself,
f ( ) denotes the proportion of investors who choose to ‡ee for liquidity . In addition to the non-liquidity constrained investors with signals below x , all liquidity constrained investorsalso ‡ee, which accounts for the term s.
Note that the marginal investor must be indi¤erent between rolling over or ‡eeing. This is implies that RO (x ; ) = N RO (x ; ). After some algebra,
As shown in the Appendix, further manipulation delivers
where ( ; x ; ; ") =
2" and = + 1 2 (0; 1):
As required by the solution tecnique, the problem has two dominance regions. Whenever > 1, the dominant strategy is to roll-over. Conversely, whenever < 0 liquidation is unaviodable and the dominant strategy is to ‡ee. 1 1 The fundamentals could include tax revenues, reserves or any other instruments that may give liquidity to the government. 1 2 In this enviroment of strategic complementarities, under some conditions on the precision of information, there is a unique equilibrium trigger straregy, which is, moreover, the unique equilibrium of the game (see Morris and Shin, 1998 
Secondary Market for Long Term Debt
Secondary market opens after investors learn their type, as the liquidity shock creates incentives to buy and sell. Sellers are those investors hit by the liquidity shock, as they get no utility from holding the bond to maturity: On the other side of the market, buyers'valuation of the bond is (1 + r L )P ( > jx ): This di¤erent valuation provides a opportunity for trade. If < , the only price at which investors can sell the asset is 0: Conversely, when > there will be meaningful transactions in the secondary market. Assuming that unconstrained investors are deep-pocketed and using a non-arbitrage argument the price of the bond is
As in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000), market imperfections prevent sellers from recovering the asset's full value . A proportion (1 ) of the sale price is lost. 15 Thus, although the price of the asset, p L ; is fair in the sense that no-one who buys it can make pro…ts above the market rate, the seller receives only p L : Long bonds are subject to price risk.
Interest rates
Equilibrium interest rates are derived from the fact that, in equilibrium, both bonds must give the same expected utility as the safe asset, which guarantees one unit of consumption; r saf e = 0. For short term bonds this implies
where
: Similarly, for long term bonds the following must hold
So, the implied long term interest rate is 1 + r L = 1 (1 + )h : As the maturity structure tilts to short term debt, thereby increasing the probability of a liquidity crises, the interest rates o¤ered need to increase.
All that is needed for uniqueness is that " is small enough (see Appendix). 1 4 This delivers a closed form solution while the e¤ect of strategic uncertainty remains. 1 5 This can be understood as fees paid to intermediaries, bid-ask spreads or, else, as the cost of looking for a buyer. The parameter represents the degree of development/liquidity of the market. More developed markets should have larger values of .
Government' s Optimal Debt Structure
Short term debt issuance increases both interest rates and, by increasing the size of the coordination problem, the probability of observing the investment ending in a failure. From the point of view of the Government, however, short term debt is cheaper in expected terms. This is so because liquidity constrained investors value future payments less than the Government. This trade o¤ between risk and cost is at the root of the problem described below.
The net outcome from the project, Y ( ), is composed of two parts,
The production function, F (I), is standard:
This collects outlays after a default due to demands by lenders. 16 Default cost is modelled in an asymmetric fashion. As default comes …rst on maturing debt, potentially triggering further problems, I assume that c 2 < c 1 :
17 The Government problem can be summarized as follows
stands for the …nancing cost and E(Y ( )) = F (I)P ( ) (cS + c 2 I)P ( ) is the expected net outcome from the project. Note that the …nancing cost is not independent of the maturity choice. The solution to this constrained maximization problem is
Finally, if B < 0 and B > 0 then
18 The elements in B represent, respectively, the reduction in the …nancing cost, the reduction on the expected return and the increase in default costs when all the investment is …nanced through short term debt. Thus, when B > 0, the reduction on the …nancing cost is bigger than the combined increase on the expected returns and default costs, and it is optimal to issue only short term debt. If, instead, the reduction of the …nancing cost from issuing . 1 7 This assumption guarantees the existence of an interior maximum. 1 8 The complete Kuhn-Tucker program for the Government can be found in the Appendix.
short term debt (…rst term in B) is smaller than the reduction on the revenues (last two terms in B), then it is optimal not to have short term debt at all (B < 0 and s = 0). It is straightforward that lower investment returns, lower litigation costs, higher roll over premia, lower recovery rates and less developed secondary markets lead to debt structures with more short term debt.
Liquidity Assistance: Lender of Last Resort
I augment the game with an additional player following the symmetric approach to global games with heterogeneous players developed in Bannier (2005) . This easily implementable approach maintains the model's ability to highlight the major issues related with this policy tool. The lender of last resort (LOLR) acts as follows. Conditional on a private signal y about it receives in the interim period, must decide whether to grant assistance of size A. 19 The LOLR signal is uniformly distributed, y U ( ; + ). As in Corsetti et al. (2006) and Rochet and Vives (2004) , I assume a non-monetary revenue function for the LOLR. 20 When a country succeeds and there is no default the LOLR obtains utility S. If, instead, the …nal outcome is a default, the LOLR obtains utility D. Using this assumptions, the LOLR's indi¤erence condition is
The recovery rate might be a¤ected by amount of funds provided, = (A). This changes investors´pay-o¤ from ‡eeing
Also the mass condition changes to include an element re ‡ecting the potential liquidity assistance
As before, RO (x ; A ) = N RO (x ; A ). Assuming that " and are arbitrarily small delivers the equilibrium values for A and s IM F :
and
The presence of the LOLR a¤ects not only the investors incentives to rollover but also the Government's preferred maturity structure. 1 9 Assuming that moves occur simultaneously eliminates the possibility that the IMF uses lending to confer information. Zwart (2006) presents this signaling device in a model without debt structure and shows that signaling is a mixed blessing. It only helps when fundamentals are strong. The same mechanism would be present here.
2 0 These simple pay-o¤s guarantee the existence of strategic complementarities. "Catalytic" e¤ect and the maturity mismatch If is not a¤ected by liquidity assistance ( (A) = ), = IM F and the pay-o¤ from ‡eeing collapses to the original one: In this case, for a given s;
3)
The presence of the LOLR decreases all thresholds, A < and x A < x : This is the catalytic e¤ect of the assistance. By reassuring investors, assistance avoids crises for a wider range of situations. Moreover, the greater the size of the assistance, the greater this e¤ect.
However, when the LOLR is present the optimal maturity choice becomes,
Not surprisingly, s increases in the presence of a LOLR, s IM F > s . If the government thinks that the LOLR is likely inject money when needed, it has an incentive to increase the proportion of short term debt and pro…t from the lower interest rate to be paid. In this model, due to the linearity of the uniform distribution, A = J 2 < 0: Therefore, the total e¤ect of the assistance is to reduce both, the probability of default and interest rates, r i > r
IM F: i
Increased recovery rates and the "rush for the exits" problem Suppose instead that the liquidity assistance, by raising the availability of resources or spurring economic growth, increases the recovery rate (A) > . In this case, the assistance can generate a "rush for the exits" e¤ect, with investors taking advantage of the Fund's support to ‡ee the country.
Proposition 1 For a given debt structure, the lower the size of the program, A, and the higher the recovery rate for a given size of the assistance, (A), the easier it becomes that the program will be unable to catalyze funds, A > :
Proof. Note that the di¤erence between A and is
It is straightforward that there exist ( ( ); A) such that the above inequality holds. Note also that the lower A is the easier the above inequality holds. One just need to realize that This is, again, a partial equilibrium result. The impact of the LOLR on and will, in turn, a¤ect the Government's optimal debt composition. The next proposition shows how the LOLR's impact on recovery rates a¤ects the optimal debt structure.
Proposition 2 As liquidity assistance raises incentives for investors to ‡ee, prospective bail-outs by the IMF will lead sovereigns issue larger amounts of long term debt.
Proof. Comparison of equations (1:4) and (2:4) using (2:5) leads to
It is enough to note that the …rst term is always positive while the second is always negative.
One can compute the total impact on stability to get
When o¢ cial assistance guarantees higher recovery rates the sovereign has incentives to reduce short term debt issuance and mitigate the impact of the "rush for the exits" e¤ect.
Empirical Evidence
This section uses data on primary issuance to present evidence on the impact of IMF bail-outs on the sovereigns'bonded debt structure. The exercise is carried out by pooling information on individual bonds to create quarterly indicators. Individual maturity observations were averaged into quarterly measures using as weights the speci…c size of each bond. The analysis focuses on the presence of the IMF, but also considers the impact of the size of the …nancing program and distinguishes e¤ects depending on the type of program signed. Given the well grounded concerns regarding then endogeneity between maturity and IMF lending, the e¤ect of the IMF on bonds maturity is also studied using an instrumental variables approach. Finally, in line with previous studies on the determinants of bond spreads (Eichengreen et al., 2001) , I perform the analysis while controlling for potential sample selection biases.
Data
Data on bond characteristics comes from DCM Analytics (Dealogic). I collected information regarding the maturity, spread, issued amount, coupon type, market of issuance, credit rating and currency denomination of the bonds. The analysis focuses on …xed coupon bonds issued on international markets on a foreign currency and for which country credit ratings were available. From this source, after applying the above mentioned criteria, I obtained almost 2300 observations of public bonds issued by 46 developing economies from 1995 to 2008. Data on IMF interventions includes the program duration, the type of program and the size of the assistance. It was obtained from the International Monetary Fund. 24 We restrict our attention to two types of programs, SBA and EFF. These programs are commonly used to address Balance of Payments problems and liquidity crises. Overall there are 70 new programs, divided into 58 SBA programs and 12 EFF agreements.
Credit ratings and information on sovereign defaults were obtained from Standard & Poor's. Data coming from the Paris Club of o¢ cial creditors was used to construct our indicator on Paris Club agreements. International liquidity is proxied in two ways. First,I use a quantity index with base in 1990, that pulls together country data about the ratio of M2 (or reserves when M2 was not available) to GDP (Erce, 2008 Table A. 2 compares issuance and maturities around bank crises and sovereign debt crises with that in normal times, both for countries under IMF programs and for countries not under the Fund's auspice. During banking crises times countries seem to issue more debt when under IMF treatment, although the bonds issued have a similar maturity. Interestingly, when faced with a debt crisis the pattern is signi…cantly di¤erent. In those situations, countries with ongoing IMF programs tap the markets less often and do it placing maturities rather lower than those of countries facing a debt crises without IMF support. During times with no debt nor bank crises, countries without an IMF program tap markets more often.
Econometric Analysis Debt maturity and IMF interventions
In order to asses the impact of IMF interventions on the observed debt structure I analyze the determinants of sovereign bonds maturity using a panel data model with …xed e¤ects and robust standard errors,
where M it stands for the weighted maturity of bonds issued by country i at time t: The macroeconomic controls: weighted average spread, credit rating, our quantity indicator of global liquidity and bank and debt crises are collected in X it . 26 This paper is mostly interested with the sign and signi…cance of , the coe¢ cient collecting the impact of the IMF on the observed maturity. As detailed below, the variable IM F it will collect not only when the IMF is present, but also the size of the assistance program or the speci…c type of program.
The results of this …rst approach can be found in Table 2 .a and Table 2 .b in the Appendix. The …rst 3 columns in Table 2 .a present the benchmark model and an extension of it including the IMF presence indicator. The results show a positive relation between observed maturities and the spreads of the bonds. 27 The credit rating and the observed maturity have a weak relation. 28 The global liquidity indicator is positively related to maturity, meaning that ampler availability of funds leads to bonds on longer maturities being issued. The two crises indicators signal to a maturity di¤erence between banking and debt crises. The later seem to feature issuances on longer maturities. The result regarding the IMF presence dummy are weak and signal to the absence of any e¤ects from o¢ cial …nancing on the observed maturity of bonds. Columns 1 and 3 in Table 2 .b contain the results of the OLS estimates but replacing the IMF presence indicator, …rst by two indicators that allow to distinguish the e¤ect of SBA programs from that of EFF programs, and then by using a measure of the relative size of the ongoing program. Interestingly the results show that it is EFF programs, as opposed to SBA programs, the ones accompanied by issuance in shorter maturities (column 1, Table 2 .a). Also the size indicator has a highly signi…cant negative relation with maturity (column 3, Table 2 .a), indicating that larger programs lead to signi…cantly shorter international bonds being issued. 29 
Instrumenting IMF presence
The fact that countries likely to need IMF support also tend face some sort of economic distress raises concern regarding the validity of the relation between maturities and IMF support. Given that maturities are related to crises (Broner et al., 2012) and that crisis are associated with IMF lending, it could be the case that we attribute to the IMF the e¤ect of other factors. To get around this critique, I also perform the analysis using an instrumental variables approach. I implement this approach in two steps. First, I estimate the likelihood of receiving an IMF treatment by means of a probit model
The indicator I
IM F it
takes a value of one whenever an IMF program is ongoing. The model controls for macroeconomic developments by including the issuer's 2 6 Bussiere and Ristiniemi (2012) argue that credit ratings contain almost teh same amoutn of informationn regarding economic distress than the commonly used macroeconmic indicators. 2 7 Broner et al. (2012) focus on understanding the demand side and …nd a negative relation. Erce (2008) uses a structural model and …nds a positive relation between spreads and maturities when analyzing the investors'maturity supply. 2 8 Hale (2001) obtains a similar result. 2 9 Notice that among the conditionality imposed on countries by the IMF it is common to …nd restrictions on short term debt issuance. This should bias the results towards …nding a positive relation, thus reinforcing the negative e¤ect just described. credit rating and various crisis indicators. In order to instrument the IMF variable I follow previous contributions. As Dreher and Vaubel (2004) and Copelovich (2004) , I include as determinants of IMF lending the total amount of resources available to the Fund. I divide them in quotas, which are the standard resources, and borrowing agreements. These agreements allow the Fund to raise temporarily, and without changing quotas, additional resources. I also include a measure of available resources. The inclusion of these variables is justi…ed on grounds that self-interested bureaucrats at the IMF have incentives to provide lending. This interest is likely to be larger, the more resources the Fund has at it's disposal. I also include indicators of engagement with the Paris Club, the countries' quota at the IMF, and indicator of alignment with the US in United Nation's voting rounds and a democracy index. 30 In the second step I reestimate the maturity equation replacing I
by it's estimated value,
The results for the …rst step are presented in Table 1 . As expected, we …nd a negative relation between ratings and IMF programs,. Better rated countries are less likely to enter into an IMF program. Results show that countries su¤ering banking crises are more likely to approach the Fund. The same does not hold true for sovereign debt crises. 31 Most of our instruments have the expected sign and are highly signi…cant.
Tables 2.a and 2.b contain the results corresponding to the second step. The last column in Table 2 .a presents the results when we instrument the IMF presence indicator. The results show now a highly signi…cant and negative relation between IMF programs and sovereign bonds' maturity. Similarly, columns 2 and 4 in Table 2 .b present the results when instrumenting the program type indicators and when instrumenting the program size, respectively. The results con…rm that EFF programs and larger program amounts accompany shorter maturities.
Tackling sample selection: Modeling the Issuance Decision
Participation in international bond markets has risen over time. If the factors driving debt maturity a¤ect also market access, OLS estimates of the relationship between maturities and these factors could be biased. This is the well known sample selection problem. To get around it I use a Heckman model to jointly estimate the issuance decision and the maturity choice,
According to Vreeland (2005) countries where the political system has more veto power are more likely to have IMF programs. SImilarly, Edwards and Santaella (1993) …nd that dictatorial regimes are more likely to engage with the IMF. Similarly, Tacker (2000) and Barro and Lee (2005) argue that political proximity to the US is important to explain IMF lending. Barro and Lee (2005) and Saravia (2011) argue that a country's quota at the IMF is also a signi…cant determinant of IMF …nancial support. 3 1 This may be due to the more stringent conditions that the Fund requests in order to engage with countries with outstanding external arreas (see Diaz-Cassou et al, 2008 ).
Access to …nancial markets in a given quarter is de…ned by binary variable, I it ; that takes value one when country i tapped the market on period t. 32 Along with the credit rating, our price-based measure of global liquidity and the IMF variables, the model contains the ratio of reserves to imports, which gives an accurate picture of the country's liquidity situation. Both equations are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood. In this case, both and contain information relevant for the question at hand. While still explains how the IMF a¤ects debt maturity, the coe¢ cient collects the e¤ect, if any, that IMF lending has in countries'ability to tap international capital markets.
Results can be found in Table 3 the Appendix. In all cases the coe¢ cients associated with the credit rating, global liquidity and the weighted spread had the expected signs. The estimation again …nds support for the scenario in which IMF lending, specially through EFF programs, reduces the observed maturity of sovereign bonds. Moreover, this e¤ect is again increasing wit the size of the o¢ cial program. Additionally, we can say something about the e¤ect of IMF lending on Governments'ability to tap international markets. The results point to a lower probability of issuance whenever a country is under an EFF program and when the program size increases. It should be noted, however, that it might well be that, to the extent that the sovereign's …nancing needs are reduced after signing a program with the Fund, this results stems from voluntary decisions and not from a crowding out e¤ect by the IMF on private lenders.
Conclusions
In this article I have analyzed, both empirically and theoretically, the impact of IMF assistance on supported countries'debt maturity structure. To set the stage of the analysis, I introduced a model in which the absence of well-developed secondary markets, combined with investors'uncertainty regarding their preferred investment horizon, make governments more willing to issue short term debt. Within the model, short term borrowing can become heavier if there are expectations of an IMF bail-out in the event of a liquidity crisis. Two e¤ects are at play. On the one hand, investors feel reassured if they believe the IMF will come into action if a crisis arises. This "insurance" leads investors to require lower short term interest rates, creating an incentive for sovereigns to borrow larger amounts in a short-term basis. On the other hand, the fresh funds granted by the IMF can lead investors to expect a higher recovery rate if they decide ‡ee. This can lead to a rush for the exits, with a larger proportion of investors not accepting to roll-over. This e¤ect gives governments incentives to lengthen their debt and avoid roll-over problems.
The empirical exercise shows that IMF …nancial support associates with the public sector issuing debt in shorter maturities. This e¤ect is especially signi…cant for EFF programs. Moreover, I …nd that the impact increases along with the size of the program. These results could be rationalized using the seniority argument described before and point to the need for the IMF to make it clearer that its support is likely to improve the recovery rate also for private creditors.
Appendix I Updated Beliefs
Recall that U [ ; 1+ ] stands for the fundamentals and xj U [ "; +"] is a private signal about : Here I show how the updating process generates P ( > jx ): We know that ( ) = Let's start with the case in which the signal is relatively small. In this case, ( ) = f j 2 ( ; x + ")g and the conditional density can easily be computed to be ( jx) = 1 x+"+ . Analogously, for very large signals, ( ) = f j 2 (x "; 1 + )g; with a density function ( jx) = 1 1 x+"+ : Finally, when ( ) = f j 2 (x "; x + ")g; the density is ( jx) = 1 2" : The next is step is using these di¤erent densities to compute P ( > jx );
The …rst element on the right hand side is
The second,
Finally, the third element is,
The conditional probability is
Recall the Pro…t condition,
This equation, combined with the conditional probability above delivers equation (2) in the text.
Uniqueness
The two equations determining the two equilibrium values, x and are
De…ne g( ; ( ; "); x( ; "); ; ") = P ( > jx ) : The necessary condition for existence and uniqueness for and x is,
The implicit function theorem (IFT for short) will be used to show that the solution, when the precision of the public, = 1 ; is arbitrarily small, is unique. First calculate the two derivatives, @g( ; ( ;");x( ;"); ;") @x
(1 x+"+ 1 ) 2 ); and @g( ; ( ;");x( ;"); ;") @
):
In the limit, lim exist, so that ( ; " 0 ) and x( ; " 0 ) are continuous in : Next, by the continuity of g( ; ( ; " 0 ); x( ; " 0 ); ; " 0 ) in , there is an interval around ( ( 0 ; " 0 ); x( 0 ; " 0 ); 0 ; " 0 ) where a solution exists, and approaches to ( ( 0 ; " 0 ); x( 0 ; " 0 )) as ! 0 : For arbitrarily small public precision a unique equilibrium exists. Note that 0 = 0 implies
= . For the sake of completeness, it will be shown that the result above holds without resorting to limiting arguments. This amounts to show that there is an lower bound for and therefore an upper bound for q = " ; such that
It su¢ ces to show the existence of an upper bound on q so that, @g( ; ( ;");x( ;"); ;") @x 6 = 0; @g( ; ( ;");x( ;"); ;") @ 6 = 0; and,
The …rst two conditions are true as long as " 6 = 1 = : For the last to hold,
As then @x P C @ P C < 1: Note that as " ! 0 the inequality becomes
The same is true as ! 0: Additionally both sides of the inequality are continuous 8" and 8 6 = 0: Clearly 8 9 " s:t: 8" < " the above inequality holds.
The Kuhn-Tucker Program of the Government
Using the functional forms posted in the text the Government´s problem is
The complementary slackness conditions for this problem are
Substituting by the relevant functional forms this becomes,
and,
where ( 
which ends the proof. 
Determinants of IMF presence
Data from 1995 to 2008. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets. 
Weighted average maturity
Estimation using fixed effects. Instruments include Paris club dummy, total IMF quota, voting aligment with the US at the UN and democratic regime dummy.Data from 1995 to 2008. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets. 
Weighted average maturity. Robustness
Estimation using fixed effects. Instruments include Paris club dummy, total IMF quota, voting aligment with the US at the UN and democratic regime dummy.Data from 1995 to 2008. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets. Table 2 .b
